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Abstract 
Spacecraft now and of the future are being controlled by 
EMC requirements of the past. Little has been done by 
the launch vehicle/spacecraft manufacturers to abandon 
MIL-STD-461C which was released in 1986 because 
most of the electronics equipment being used aboard 
current launch vehicles is approved by similarity and 
heritage to MIL-STD-46 1 C and its predecessors. Twenty 
years later these electronic equipment items are still not 
tested to today's MIL-STD-461E requirements because 
there is a risk that the items will fail to meet the 
requirements and thus the cost will increase if it becomes 
necessary to redesign the equipment. That cost is 
insignificant compared with the cost of losing an entire 
mission! 
In the 20 years that have elapsed since MIL-STD-461C 
was released, the EMC environment has undergone major 
changes. High speed digital devices have been created 
that have fundamental clock and bus frequencies that 
span the entire LV/SC frequency range from the Flight 
Termination Systems through C and S-Band telemetry. 
Personnel involved in ground operations routinely carry 
and use hand held transceivers and cellular telephones 
close by sensitive electronics equipment. There are now 
many more orbiting receivers and emitters, plus range 
assets have increased dramatically since 2001. It's way 
past time to bring requirements up-to-date! 
I. Introduction/Purpose 
Early spacecraft EMC requirements were based on the 
RF environment and equipment sensitivities at the time of 
their creation. 
Over the last 40 years, the RF environment has changed 
dramatically, but much of the LV avionics equipment is 
still being approved by similarity to the older equipment. 
Although the components that are used in the equipment 
design are markedly different their function remains the 
same and that is being used to justify that the equipment 
is similar to the previous equipment. The components 
and equipment really have under gone major changes but
LV/SC EMC requirements have not kept pace with these 
changes. That has increased the risk of EMC problems. 
This presentation compares the radiated heritage 
requirements with MIL-STD-461C and MIL-STD-461E; 
provide examples of the emission levels from the RF 
environment and addresses the needs to have modem 
spacecraft designed to meet modem systems level EMC 
requirements. 
Many of the changes to MIL-STD-461 are in the 
conducted test requirements that measure power ripple 
and transient data. While these changes are important, 
the emphasis of this paper is on the radiated susceptibility 
limits. 
H. 50 years of continuity and change 
The RF environment is continuously changing. Although 
the first recorded incidents of an EMC problems were 
being reported in the late 1800's, it wasn't until the 
Federal Radio Commission began regulating AM Radio 
(the primary electronic device of the time) in 1927 that 
any controls were enacted on the commercial broadcast 
industry. These controls were upgraded in the 
Telecommunications Act of 1933 and in 1934 the US 
Army Signal Corps released SCL-49 entitled "Electrical 
Shielding and Radio Power Supply in Vehicles" New 
electronic devices continued to be developed driving 
changes in the RF environment accompanied by new 
standards and finally in January 1958 with the launch of 
Explorer I we have the beginnings of the space age. 
The early launch vehicles have evolved into two major 
families - the Atlas and the Delta. As shown in Figure 1 
these are majestic vehicles. The EMC requirements for 
the hardware comprising the first launches of the 
predecessors to today's versions of the Atlas and Delta 
primary launch vehicles were based on MIL-1-6181 
(1953) and MIL-STD-826 (1964). These were the 
foundation documents for MIL-STD-461 (1967). Because 
of the changing RF environment this standard has 
continued to be developed and the MIL-STD-461C 
(1986) revision which is currently being used for today's
LV/SC looks nothing at all like today's MIL-STD-461E 
(1999) which is already 6 years old. A comparison of the 
radiated requirements of MIL-STD-461 along with the 
systems requirements from MIL-STD-464A and the 
newly proposed MIL-STD-1541B, are shown in Figure 
2. The most significant change has been the radiated 
susceptibility requirement levels. Since the creation of 
MIL-STD461 the radiated susceptibility levels have 
increased by 46 dB with an increase of 32 dB occurring 
since the MIL-STD-461C revision was released. Every 
revision to MIL-STD-461 specification has increased the 
Radiated Susceptibility Levels while reducing the 
Radiated Emission Levels thus reflecting the real world 
situation of an increasingly noisier RF environment. 
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Figure 2. Mil Standard Radiated limit comparison 
It is not true that a collection of hardware where each 
item meets the MIL-STD-461 requirements will result in 
a system that meets the same requirements. In addition,
systems that are used in space applications have some 
peculiar requirements that ground based systems don't 
have. The system needs to work and perform its intended 
function no-matter-what. After all it is very difficult to 
implement a fix when the malfunctioning device is in low 
earth orbit or beyond. It is for that reason that EMC 
requirements are levied against the system. MIL-E-
6051 was used for early LVISC and required subsystems 
to meet MIL-STD-461. Then in 1973, MIL-STD-1541 
(1973) was released. This standard was specifically 
developed for LV/SC systems and written as a 
companion document for MIL-STD-461A. It did retain 
some of the characteristics of MIL-E-6051 in that the 
system had to be functional in an environment that was 
essentially defined by adding 6 dB (20 dB for ordnance) 
to the worst case emission profile. 
The MIL-STD-1541A (1987) revision was released as a 
companion to MIL-STD-461C (1986) and added power 
system transient controls, design requirements for 
composite structure, and controls on interference that 
might result from spectral and orbital congestion. There 
were minor changes carried over from MIL-STD-1541 
relative to the MIL-STD-461C (1986) radiated emission 
requirement and no changes to the radiated susceptibility 
requirement. That is where we are today. Stuck back in 
time 20 years with some items that have been previously 
approved by similarity still meeting 40 year old 
requirements. 
It is in everyone's best interest to test like you fly but the 
players are not doing this because it costs money to prove 
that each major element of the lv/sc/launchpad is self 
compatible a-n-d also compatible with the environments 
that may be encountered during manufacture, 
transportation, and launch. What does not appear to be 
being considered is that the 3 year setback and loss of one 
$800,000,000.00 LVISC system buys a lot of EMC 
engineering services. . . even at today's prices! 
MIL-STD461 continues to be revised to keep pace with 
both the ever changing environment and the advances in 
hardware with the MIL-STD461F revision currently 
underway. 
III. RF Environment 
Although we take computers and other sophisticated 
electronic systems for granted these days, the integrated 
circuit was not invented until 1958 and Intel's first 4004 
cpu arrived in 1971. Since then, a multitude of new 
devices and systems have been developed which either 
intentionally or unintentionally compete for space in the 
RF spectrum. The higher level unclassified RF emitters 
that we are most concerned with at the launch sites and in 
orbit are listed in Table 1. 
SAMPLING OF THE RF ENVIRONMENT 
Ambient
-	 Citizen's Band 
AM/FM/TV Broadcast
-	 Commercial Radio 
Amateur Radio 
Frequencies Trunkin9 Radios 
- 160niI1.875M -	 Hybrid/Electric Powered Vehicles and Equipment 
- 80m13.75M 
- 40m17.5M -	 ignition systems 
- 20mI15M -	 indirect Lightning 
- 15rnf20M •	 HF and EF 
- 10mI30M -	 Military Communications 
- 6m/50M -	 Notebook computers 
- 2mJ144M -	 PDA's 
- 220MHz -	 Range Radars 
- 440MHz -	 Shipboard 
- Other bands to 300 •	 Radar, VHF, and SSB 
GHz
-	 Tools 
Power output 1500w PEP
- Wireless LAN 
Biuetooth2.4GHz •	 802.11 
Cell Phones/Pagers
Table I - Chart of all the different RF emitters 
The intentional frequencies used by LV are relatively 
narrow, consisting principally of the FTS UHF band 
around 420 MHz, and C-Band and S-Band microwave 
frequencies around 2.2 and 5.6 GHz. The SC on the 
other hand may have other types of RF devices and 
specialized low level sensors that may respond to RF 
energy at many different frequencies. These frequencies 
may be generated directly by the culprit RF sources or 
may result from non linear mixing of multiple sources. 
Other contributors to the RF environment are range 
controlled assets and transmitters external to KSC. There 
is documentation available that provides the levels of 
these controlled sources and of other fixed known sources 
such as weather radars and TV stations. The range 
controlled sources are often masked or otherwise 
controlled to provide a defined RF environment at 
various launch sites. Known sources can be planned for 
and incorporated in test planning. It is important to note 
the daily KSC monitoring stations have detected levels 
from off site emitters that are theoretically beyond the 
horizon and at times detected levels higher than the 
theoretical free space maximum. This is possibly due to 
multipath and atmospheric ducting effects. That is one 
reason why margin is needed. An envelope of these 
sources is also more useful than using a lower baseline 
and testing to the individual sources as new range sources 
can be added late in the program and typically have to 
meet the standard range limit for the given launch site.
20 V/rn is typical. Although radars can be controlled to 
these limits, there is sometimes the need to implement 
spacecraft limits bypass. In other words, if there is active 
tracking on a launch and an incident occurs, tracking the 
vehicle will be a priority over honoring the limits. 
Certain range tests can also be performed without radar 
limits in place. Coordination of these limit bypass 
periods is necessary. 
Other RF transient sources are from shipboards near 
launch site ports and form air traffic. Notices are sent out 
to control these emitters on launch day. These notices are 
more effective for aircraft than for ship/boat emitters and 
there is no general protection from these emitters during 
launch site processing. 
Other RF Sources External To KSC 
KSC is a confined/controlled access location limited to 
individuals with permission to come on site. 
Uncontrolled individuals cannot get closer than the 
perimeter fence or the coast line. The closest separation 
distance is estimated to be at the coast line and is 
approximately 1000 meters. At this separation distance, 
it would require > 50kW to upset a non RF device that 
was sensitive at levels of 21 V/rn. The current licensed 
transmitters capable of generating RF power levels of that 
magnitude are identified in range documentation. There 
are, however, ISM devices that can generate greater than 
50kW, but these would likely be identified on local KSC 
RF monitoring stations if the items are used continuously 
for several minutes. 
Other RF Source Internal To KSC (Handhelds and 
Land Mobiles) 
Co-Site RF susceptibility for non RF equipment could be 
a problem if exposed to high power RF sources, if those 
sources were brought close to sensitive electronic 
devices. The most likely RF source candidates would be 
land mobile or hand held radios. These could be KSC 
Operations or Amateur Radio. Amateur radio stations 
can transmit with up to 1500 watts peak envelope power 
on frequencies in designated bands from 1.8 MHz to over 
300 GHz. The FCC does not control antenna gain or 
placement at Amateur stations and some emission types 
such as phase or frequency shift keying have high duty 
cycles which results in higher average power levels. 
Thus is possible that an Amateur Radio station could 
have an ERP of 15 kW or more. 
However, most Hams operating mobile at frequencies of 
28.0 MHz and above restrict their operations to 50 to 80 
Watts or less because of the limitations of commercially 
available equipment. Those operating mobile at 
frequencies of 28 MHz and below generally restrict their 
operations to 200 Watts or less because of FCC power 
restrictions in the Novice Bands and the limitations on 
primary battery power in their vehicles (full output power 
requires approximately 22 amps). A 200 watt transceiver 
will produce I V/rn at 250 feet and 10 V/rn at 25 feet. An 
80 Watt transceiver will produce 1 V/rn at 160 feet and 
10 V/rn at 16 feet. It is highly unlikely that an Amateur 
mobile station would/could be brought within 250 feet of 
sensitive electronics equipment installed on a LV. 
The greatest risk comes from the 5 to 7 watt hand held 
transceivers. Although operational controls exist, these 
devices are easily carried and can be brought very close 
to the sensitive equipment where RF field strengths are 
high enough to cause equipment susceptibility (refer to 
chart for separation distance vs. power). 
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Figure 3. Electric-Field Strength vs Transmitter Distance 
and ERP* 
Although operational controls exist for these handheld 
type emitters, the number of people who carry these 
devices is great so relying completely on operational 
constraints in the handheld frequency range is a risk. 
It is important to note that the risk from these sources is 
not generally destructive but only causes operational 
malfunctions/disruptions during the time the interfering 
source is present. If an upset occurs from an intermittent 
source, having an unverified failure can cause large 
schedule costs. If testing is performed at reasonably 
expected levels, it can be shown whether or not 
equipment is sensitive at certain frequencies. In this case,
additional operational constraints can be put in place and 
a starting point to check for potential interferers is 
known. 
Although the power output from handheld RF devices is 
generally limited to a maximum of 7 watts because of 
RADHAZ safety constraints, their portability makes them 
particularly troublesome. As is illustrated in the 
following table, the higher power hand held devices can 
easily create EF levels over 20 V/rn. Tests performed by 
Oak Ridge National Laboratories (ORNL) shown in 
Table 2 indicated that approximately 50 % of electronics 
devices are susceptible to EF levels in the amplitude 
range from 20 to 50 V/m. Devices tested were 
predominately non-RF solid state analog control systems 
used in Nuclear Power Plants. 
PARAMETER HANDHELD 
HI
CELL 
PHONE
MICRO-
CELLULAR 
PWR OUT 5 Watts 600mW 1 MW 
ANT GAIN 1.64 1.64 1.64 
ERP 8.2W 972 mW 1.64 mW 
DISTANCE cm Vim Vim Vim 
2000 0.78 0.27 0.01 
1000 1.57 0.54 0.02 
500 3.14 1.1 0.05 
300 5.2 1.8 0.07 
200 7.7 2.7 0.11 
100 15 5.4 0.22 
50 31 11 0.49 
30 52 18 0.73 
20 
10
I I	 27 
54
1.1 
2.2 
5 4.4
TABLE 3. Susceptibility to llandbeld 11"initters 
RF Susceptibility of RF equipment 
The focus of this paper is susceptibility of non-RF 
equipment. RF equipment is designed to process RF 
signals. In the case of an RF receiver, its passband 
sensitivity make it extremely susceptible to low level RF 
signals that fall within the passband. These signals can 
be generated directly at the receiver frequency or as a 
result of intermodulation. For example the LV/SC FTS 
system and radio amateurs share the 420 MHz band. It is 
very important for launch vehicles and spacecraft to 
specify interference and damage levels for their receivers 
and to protect this equipment from equipment and RF 
environment interference. 
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RF Environment During Launch and on-orbit 
The vehicle may fly closer to an emitter during launch 
than it is on the pad. There are also downrange emitters 
that can cause strong fields at the vehicle. In this case 
the trajectory of the vehicle must be considered. Data 
bases that are developed by the Joint Spectrum Center are 
used to determine these levels. We have recently started 
predicting ascent field levels for each mission based on 
the flight trajectory. In addition, once the spacecraft 
separates from the vehicle the on-orbit fields must be 
considered if it will be in a near earth orbit. It is common 
for tracking radars to use spacecraft as targets of 
opportunity and field levels from both US and other 
emitters can be as high as 100's of volts/meter. 
Additionally there are other extremely high level emitters 
(over the horizon back scatter RADAR, etc.) that produce 
levels in the 1000's of V/rn that SC trajectories may 
inadvertently cross. Table 3 shows the worst case ascent 
and on-orbit field levels. Some of the emitters reflected 
in this table such as C-Band tracking radars are mitigated, 
however some can not be, especially foreign emitters. 
Frequency Hz FactorylTranspoit Ascent On-Orbit On-orbit On-Orbit 
Launch Proc/Pad 100 nml 500 km 1000 nml 
lOk-1.99M 251 ,20" 20'.' 20'.' 20'.' 20'.' 
2-99M 501,202.3 20'.' 20'.' 20'.' 202' 
100-999M 1002, 1002, 50, 201,4, 201,4, 
1500' 1500' 40, 1002 100' 1002 
- 3.99G 2501, 2002, 190' 704, 20" 
2002,2500' 25002 100', 200' 40', 200' 200' 
4— 10.99G 10001, 10007, 5004, 200', 5Q4 
25002, 440002 2500' 120', 2002 50', 200' 203-1,2002 
11 -46G 501, 20", 70' 30' 20'.' 
1500' 15001
Table 3. RFI Susceptibility Verification Levels for Worst 
Case (Polar) Orbit, Any Launch Area 
IV. The need to change (Need to increase test levels - 
Equipment changes) 
The problem continues to worsen. In the quest to process 
data faster and cheaper, large scale integrated circuits are 
being designed with 
• Smaller geometry to reduce self inductance, 
• Greater packaging density 
• Shorter substrate conductors 
• Lower 0/1 state change voltage swings, 
• Lower power requirements 
• No internal protection diodes 
• Limited shunt protection capacitance 
• Plastic packages 
• Higher device speed (directly related to 
bandwidth)
Just as Moore predicted 30 years ago, component density 
doubles about every two years and data processing is 
increasing at an exponential rate! What he failed to 
mention was that these advances would be accompanied 
by a corresponding increase in EMC problems. 
Since the differential mode radiated electric field is 
proportional to the square of the freuqency, reducing the 
drive current and the radiating loop area has resulted in a 
reduction of the emission levels of individual substrate 
components while at the same time enabling systems to 
process data faster. Unfortunately the increase in the 
number of components changing state simultaneously 
(synchronously with a clock) at these increased switching 
speeds has increased the emission levels faster than the 
lower power and smaller loop areas have reduced it. The 
net result is an overall increase in RF emission from 
systems, especially at the higher frequencies where the 
wiring and PCB traces acting as antennas have greater 
efficiency. 
The wider bandwidth and lower power requirements have 
increased the susceptibility of the system across the RF 
spectrum to any culprit signals that fall within the 
passband of the system. The problem is compounded by 
new RF/wireless communication devices that continue to 
be developed that operate or produce harmonics in the 
same general frequency range as the LV/SC tracking and 
telemetry equipment. Since it may take years from the 
time a LV/SC system is conceived until it's delivered, 
any future EMC problems cannot be solved by tailoring 
because tailoring presumes that the environment is 
known when in fact it is not. There will always be 
unknown and uncontrolled emitters with a new one born 
ever day. Shielding once worked because fairings used to 
be made from formed aluminum with 100's of dB 
attenuation but now they are made from composite 
materials with 10— 15 dB attenuation or less. 
V. Recommendations 
The most conservative approach is to test to the most 
severe environment the launch vehicle/spacecraft is likely 
to see. Using a recognized military standard that defines 
system level requirements such as MIL-STD-464 or the 
new MIL-STD-1541 is a good approach. EMC tests are 
performed with a single source slowly swept through the 
frequency range where as during actually operation the 
LV/SC system is immersed in a complex RF environment 
made up of an ever changing combination of signals 
[4] MIL-STD-461E, DOD Interface Standard, 
Requirements for the Control of Electromagnetic 
Interference Characteristics of Subsystems and 
Equipment; 20 August 1999 
[5] MIL-STD-464, DOD Interface Standard, 
Electromagnetic Environmental Effects, 
Requirements for Systems; 18 March 1997 
[6] MIL-E-6051, Military Specification, Electrical-
Electronic System Compatibility and Interference 
Control Requirements of Aeronautical Weapon 
Systems, Associated Subsystems and Aircraft; 17 
June 1960 
[7] MIL-STD-15411A (USAF), Electromagnetic 
Compatibility Requirements For Space Systems; 
15 October 1973/30 December 1987 
[8] Electromagnetic Compatibility Requirements For 
Space Equipment And Systems, Aerospace Report 
No. TOR-2005(8583)-1; 8 August 2005 
[9] MI-lB 5320.3, EMC Principals and Practices, 
NASA; October 1965 
[10] EMC Technology Magazine, Standards 
& Regulation, MIL-STD-461 Update, Frank E. 
Rock, October 1986 
[11] The History of Military EMC 
Specifications, Warren Kesselrnan, and Herbert 
Mertel, 
http://www.ieee.org/organizations/pubs/newslette 
rs/emcs/summerO0/emcstan.htm; Summer 2000 
[12] The Need for a Universal EMC Test 
Standard, Part I and 2, Ronald W Brewer, 
Evaluation Engineering; September 2002 
[13] Prediction of RF Environments 
Worldwide for Ground, Airborne, and Space 
Launch Trajectory Applications via Automated 
Database, Leslie R. Warboys and James A. 
Lukash, 1999 IEEE International Symposium on 
EMC; August 1999 
occurring simultaneously. Interfacing with range and 
other launch site personnel to keep informed of the latest 
emitter environment for the specific launch processing 
facility and launch pad is also essential. This approach is 
recommended for all launch vehicles since they are likely 
at some point to incur a space craft limits bypass scenario 
and the hardware should be designed to be durable. 
Many launch vehicles will run a systems test with range 
emitters intentionally pointed at the launch vehicle at 
their maximum power levels. 
For spacecraft, the most risk free approach should be 
considered. Since many spacecraft are designed to make 
sensitive measurements, testing to full radar levels could 
pose a risk to the S/C. However, not testing to an 
environment they are likely to see is also a risk. We 
recommend (as a minimum) spacecraft test to the agreed 
to range emitter control levels for the launch site. These 
levels are typically at least 20 V/rn for each site. 
Although, these levels are not guaranteed, the range will 
take particular effort to control their emitters when a 
sensitive spacecraft is on the pad. Blanking and elevation 
angle constraints can be used to protect processing 
facilities. There are also normally operational 
constraints for handheld emitters, but since multiple 
people have to be relied on to follow these constraints, it 
is not recommended that field levels be lowered below 20 
V/rn. As previously shown this level is more of a 
sensitivity level than a damage level and if particular 
sensitivities are found during testing, it only aids in the 
convincing personnel that added precautions are needed 
to protect the spacecraft. If a spacecraft is in a series, 
such as weather and communication satellites, the risks of 
eventually having and EMC problem increases and test 
requirements should be increased accordingly. 
This is not your father's space craft. Thermal levels may 
remain the same, but the RF levels do not. 
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